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Abstract
A framework is developed that extends Hilbert-style proof systems for propositional and modal
logics to comprehend their team-based counterparts. The method is applied to classical propo-
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1 Introduction
Propositional and modal logics, while their history goes back to ancient philosophers, have
assumed an outstanding role in the age of modern computer science, with plentiful applications
in software verification, modeling, artificial intelligence, and protocol design. An important
property of a logical framework is completeness, i.e., that the act of mechanical reasoning
can effectively be done by a computer.
A recent extension of classical logics is the generalization to team semantics, i.e., formulas
are evaluated on whole sets of assignments. So-called team based logics allow a more
sophisticated expression of facts that regard multiple states of a system simultaneously as
well as their internal relationship towards each other. The concept of team logic originated
from the idea of quantifier dependence and independence. The question was simple and is
long-known in linguistics: How can the statement
For every 𝑥 there is 𝑦(𝑥), and for every 𝑢 there is 𝑣(𝑢) such that P(x,y,u,v)
be formalized? The fact that 𝑣 should only depend on 𝑢 cannot be expressed with first-order
quantifiers. Some suggestions were the independence-friendly logic ℐℱ by Hintikka and
Sandu [7] or the dependence logic 𝒟 by Väänänen [15]. Hodges found that a compositional
semantics of ℐℱ can be formulated with the concept of teams [8], which was adapted by
Väänänen [14, 15] together with an atom of dependence, written =(𝑥, 𝑦) or dep(𝑥, 𝑦).
Beside Väänänen’s dependence atom a variety of atomic formulas solely for the reasoning
in teams were introduced. Galliani and others found a connection to database theory;
they defined common constraints like independence ⊥, inclusion ⊆ and exclusion | in the
framework of team semantics [2, 4]. Beside first-order logic, all these atoms were also adapted
for modal logic ℳℒ [14] and recently propositional logic 𝒫ℒ [16].
As for any logic system, the question of axiomatizability arose. After all, team logics
enable reasoning about sets of valuations, and predicate logic with set quantifiers (𝒮𝒪) is not
axiomatizable. An important connection to team logic was found in the sense that dependence
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logic 𝒟 is as powerful as existential second-order logic 𝒮𝒪(∃) [15], and that its extension 𝒯 ℒ
(where a semantical negation ∼ is provided) is even equivalent to full second-order logic 𝒮𝒪
[10]; therefore both are non-axiomatizable. Later Kontinen and Väänänen showed that there
is a partial axiomatization in the sense that ℱ𝒪 consequences of 𝒟 formulas are derivable
[11]. For many weaker team logics the question of axiomatizability is open. Exceptions are
certain fragments of propositional and modal team logic. They were axiomatized by Sano
and Virtema [13] and Yang [16], but these solutions rely on the absence of Boolean negation.
Contribution
In this paper complete axiomatizations of 𝒫𝒯 ℒ and ℳ𝒯 ℒ are given, the full propositional
and modal team logics. A crucial step in the completeness proof is the fact that 𝒫𝒯 ℒ is not
more expressive than a (team semantical) Boolean combination of classical 𝒫ℒ formulas,
in symbols 𝒫𝒯 ℒ ≡ ℬ(𝒫ℒ). In the modal case analogously ℳ𝒯 ℒ ≡ ℬ(ℳℒ) holds. For a
similar application to first-order logic see the technical report [12].
The paper is built as follows: After reminding the reader of several foundational definitions
(Section 2), complete axiomatizations for the Boolean closures ℬ(𝒫ℒ) and ℬ(ℳℒ) are
presented (Section 3). The collapses from 𝒫𝒯 ℒ and ℳ𝒯 ℒ to ℬ(𝒫ℒ) and ℬ(ℳℒ) are then
proven step-wise by axiomatizing the elimination of splitting (Section 4) and modalities
(Section 5).
2 Preliminaries
If in the following 𝐴 is a set, then P(𝐴) refers to its power set. The notation [𝑛] will be used
for the set {1, . . . , 𝑛}, assuming 𝑛 ∈ N.
We define a logic as a triple ℒ = (𝛷,A,). The component 𝛷 is a countable set consisting
of finite words over some alphabet 𝛴, the so-called formulas of ℒ. The set A contains possible
valuations of formulas in 𝛷, and the binary relation  is the truth or satisfaction relation
between A and 𝛷. To distinguish between different satisfaction relations we sometimes write
ℒ. We use the same symbol for the entailment relation, 𝜙  𝜓 meaning that ∀𝐴 ∈ A : 𝐴  𝜙
implies 𝐴  𝜓. These relations are as usual generalized to sets, 𝐴  𝛷meaning ∀𝜙 ∈ 𝛷 : 𝐴  𝜙,
and 𝛷  𝜓 meaning that ∀𝐴 ∈ A : 𝐴  𝛷 implies 𝐴  𝜓.
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the foundations of classical propositional and
modal logics. We define classical propositional logic via a countable set 𝒫𝒮 := {𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . .}
of atomic propositional statements and the connectives → and ¬. Truth ⊤ and falsum ⊥
are defined as (𝑥1 → 𝑥1) and ¬⊤, respectively. On top of propositional logic, modal logic is
defined with the additional unary modality  with the standard Kripke semantics.
2.1 Team logics
Let ℒ be a logic. We introduce two new operators to ℒ: The unary strong negation ∼ and
the binary material implication _ (under the assumption that they are not symbols in
formulas of ℒ). The logic ℬ(ℒ) is the Boolean closure of ℒ and is defined by the following
grammar, where 𝛼 stands for any ℒ-formula: 𝜙 ::= 𝛼 | ∼𝜙 | (𝜙 _ 𝜙). Note that in
particular any atom of the logic ℒ is an atom of ℬ(ℒ), but connecting ℒ-formulas with
∼ or _ always yields formulas not in ℒ. We further use the symbol ⊥ (strong falsum),
⊥ := ∼(𝜓 _ 𝜓), and the abbreviations (𝜙6 𝜓) := (∼𝜙_ 𝜓), (𝜙7 𝜓) := ∼(𝜙_ ∼𝜓) and
(𝜙] 𝜓) := (𝜙_ 𝜓)7 (𝜓 _ 𝜙). The semantics of ℬ(ℒ) extend ℒ by, given some valuation
𝐴 ∈ A of ℒ, as follows: 𝐴  ∼𝜙⇔ 𝐴 2 𝜙 and 𝐴  𝜙_ 𝜓 ⇔ 𝐴 2 𝜙 or 𝐴  𝜓.
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The next operator introduced in team logic is the binary operator (, called linear
implication, similar as in Väänänen’s first-order team logic 𝒯 ℒ [15]. Assume that the logic
ℒ = (𝛷,A,) has a splitting relation 𝜎ℒ ⊆ A3. If (𝐴,𝐵,𝐶) ∈ 𝜎ℒ then we say that (𝐵,𝐶)
is a splitting or division of 𝐴. The semantics is that 𝐴  𝜙 ( 𝜓 if for all (𝐵,𝐶) with
(𝐴,𝐵,𝐶) ∈ 𝜎ℒ it holds 𝐵 2 𝜙 or 𝐶  𝜓. Abbreviate 𝜙 𝜓 := ∼(𝜙( ∼𝜓). If a logic ℒ has
a splitting relation, then the syntax of 𝒮(ℒ) is the extension of ℬ(ℒ) by the grammar rule
𝜙 ::= (𝜙( 𝜙).
Propositional team logic 𝒫𝒯 ℒ is the logic of 𝒮(𝒫ℒ)-formulas. A valuation of 𝒫𝒯 ℒ is
a team 𝑇 which is a (possibly empty) set of propositional assignments 𝑠 : 𝒫𝒮 → {0, 1}. If
𝜙 ∈ 𝒫ℒ then 𝑇  𝜙 if 𝑠  𝜙 in 𝒫ℒ semantics for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑇 . A division of a team 𝑇 is simply
a pair (𝑆,𝑈) such that 𝑆 ∪ 𝑈 = 𝑇 .
Modal team logic ℳ𝒯 ℒ is the closure of ℳℒ under ∼,_,( (as above) and the unary
modalities  and ∆. Abbreviate ♦ := ∼∆∼. In contrast to ℳℒ, valuations are not pointed
Kripke structures (𝒦, 𝑤) but have the form (𝒦, 𝑇 ), where 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑊 is called a team. For
𝜙 ∈ ℳℒ it holds (𝒦, 𝑇 )  𝜙 if (𝒦, 𝑤)  𝜙 in ℳℒ semantics for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑇 . A division of
(𝒦, 𝑇 ) is a pair ((𝒦, 𝑆), (𝒦, 𝑈)) such that 𝑆 ∪ 𝑈 = 𝑇 .
If (𝑊,𝑅, 𝑉 ) is a Kripke structure, then we define the image 𝑅[𝑇 ] of a team 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑊
as { 𝑤 ∈𝑊 | ∃𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 : 𝑣𝑅𝑤 } and the pre-image 𝑅−1[𝑇 ] as { 𝑤 ∈𝑊 | ∃𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 : 𝑤𝑅𝑣 }. A
successor team 𝑇 ′ of 𝑇 is a team such that 𝑇 ′ ⊆ 𝑅[𝑇 ] and 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑅−1[𝑇 ′]. The semantics of 
and ∆ is (𝐾,𝑇 )  𝜙 if (𝐾,𝑅[𝑇 ])  𝜙, and (𝐾,𝑇 )  ∆𝜙 if for all successor teams 𝑇 ′ of 𝑇 it
holds (𝐾,𝑇 ′)  𝜙.
In the following we drop parentheses according to the usual precedence rules; further we
assume →, _ and ( as right-associative and ∧,7,∨,6, as left-associative.
Also we reserve the letters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, . . . for classical 𝒫ℒ,ℳℒ formulas; and we use 𝜙,𝜓, 𝜗, . . .
for general 𝒫𝒯 ℒ and ℳ𝒯 ℒ formulas.
2.2 Proof systems
Proof systems or calculi are connected to the so-called Entscheidungsproblem, the problem of
algorithmically deciding if a given formula 𝜙 of a logic ℒ is valid. Formally we define a proof
system as a triple 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼) where 𝛯 is a set of formulas, 𝛹 ⊆ 𝛯 is a set of axioms, and
𝐼 ⊆ P(𝛯)×𝛯 is a set of inference rules. 𝛯, 𝛹 and 𝐼 are all countable and decidable.
An 𝛺-proof 𝒫 from a given set of premises 𝛷 ⊆ 𝛯 is a finite sequence 𝒫 = (𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛)
of finite sets 𝑃𝑖 ⊆ 𝛯 such that 𝜉 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 implies 𝜉 ∈ 𝑃𝑖−1 ∪ 𝛹 ∪ 𝛷 or 𝐼(𝑃 ′𝑖−1, 𝜉) for some
𝑃 ′𝑖−1 ⊆ 𝑃𝑖−1. We say that 𝒫 proves or derives a formula 𝜙 from 𝛷 if 𝜙 ∈ 𝑃𝑛 and 𝒫 is an
𝛺-proof from 𝛷. We write 𝛷 ⊢𝛺 𝜙 if there is some 𝛺-proof that proves 𝜙 from 𝛷. If 𝛺 is
clear then we just write 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙. If two formulas 𝜙 and 𝜙′ prove each other, i.e., {𝜙} ⊢ 𝜙′ and
{𝜙′} ⊢ 𝜙, then we write 𝜙 ⊣⊢ 𝜙′. For sets write 𝛷 ⊣⊢ 𝛷′ if for every 𝜙 ∈ 𝛷 it holds 𝛷′ ⊢ 𝜙,
and for every 𝜙′ ∈ 𝛷′ it holds 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙′.
A calculus 𝛺 is sound for a logic ℒ if for 𝛷 ⊆ ℒ, 𝜙 ∈ ℒ it holds that 𝛷 ⊢𝛺 𝜙 implies
𝛷 ℒ 𝜙, and it is complete if conversely 𝛷 ℒ 𝜙 implies 𝛷 ⊢𝛺 𝜙. We say 𝛺′ is stronger than
𝛺, in symbols 𝛺′ ⪰ 𝛺, if 𝛷 ⊢𝛺 𝜙 implies 𝛷 ⊢𝛺′ 𝜙. Clearly if 𝛺′ is sound, then 𝛺 is sound,
and if 𝛺 is complete, then 𝛺′ is complete. The union of two systems 𝛺, 𝛺′ is defined as
component-wise union and just written 𝛺𝛺′.
The proof systems presented in this article are based on classical Hilbert-style axiomati-
zations of propositional and modal logic, as depicted in Figure 1. The propositional system
H0 consists of the axiom schemas (A1)–(A3) and the inference rule (E→) (modus ponens).
The modal logic 𝐾, the weakest normal modal logic, is obtained by the system H, which
CSL 2016
33:4 Axiomatizations for Propositional and Modal Team Logic
(A1) 𝛼→ (𝛽 → 𝛼)
(A2) (𝛼→ (𝛽 → 𝛾))→ (𝛼→ 𝛽)→ (𝛼→ 𝛾)
(A3) (¬𝛼→ ¬𝛽)→ (𝛽 → 𝛼)
(K) (𝛼→ 𝛽)→ (𝛼→ 𝛽)
(E→) 𝛼 𝛼→ 𝛽
𝛽
(Nec) 𝛼 (𝛼 theorem)𝛼
Figure 1 Hilbert-style axiomatizations of 𝒫ℒ and ℳℒ.
consists of the axiom schemas (A1)–(A3) and the (K) axiom schema as well as the inference
rules (E→) and (Nec) (necessitation).
In Figure 1, theorem means that 𝛼 was derived without assumptions. Indeed the deduction
𝛼 ⊢ 𝛼 would not be valid otherwise.
We defined 𝒫ℒ and ℳℒ in team semantics to be flat, i.e., to have the flatness property:
A formula is satisfied by a team 𝑇 in team semantics exactly when all of 𝑇 ’s members satisfy
it in classical semantics. In the following we emphasize this by referring to flat logics as
ℱ . From the flatness property we can prove that it is unnecessary to distinguish between a
classical and a team-semantical entailment relation.
I Proposition 2.1. Let ℱ ∈ {𝒫ℒ,ℳℒ}, 𝛤 ⊆ ℱ , 𝛼 ∈ ℱ . Then 𝛤  𝛼 holds in team semantics
if and only if it holds in classical semantics.
Proof. We prove the 𝒫ℒ case. “⇒” follows since assignments are just singleton teams. For
“⇐” let 𝑇  𝛤 . Then ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑇 : 𝑠  𝛤 , hence ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑇 : 𝑠  𝛼. By flatness again 𝑇  𝛼. J
I Corollary 2.2. In team semantics the calculi H0 and H are sound and complete for 𝒫ℒ
and ℳℒ.
Other straightforward consequences of flatness are the following, where ℱ ∈ {𝒫ℒ,ℳℒ}:
I Proposition 2.3 (Downward closure). If 𝐴  𝛼 for a formula 𝛼 ∈ ℱ , then 𝐴1  𝛼 and
𝐴2  𝛼 for all divisions (𝐴1, 𝐴2) of 𝐴.
I Proposition 2.4 (Union closure). If 𝐴1  𝛼 and 𝐴2  𝛼 for a formula 𝛼 ∈ ℱ , then 𝐴  𝛼
for all 𝐴 which have a division into (𝐴1, 𝐴2).
I Proposition 2.5 (Flatness of ). For all 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ ℱ it holds 𝐴  𝛼 ∨ 𝛽 if and only if
𝐴  𝛼 𝛽.
Note that propositional and modal team logics are defined in literature using only literals
like 𝑝,¬𝑝 as atoms. The classical operators ¬,∨ and ∧ (plus ,♦ in the modal case) are
then the primitive connectives (see e.g. Väänänen, Sano and Virtema [13, 14, 15]), where ∨
is written  here. With this approach, every team-logical formula with the flatness property
is already syntactically identical with the corresponding classical formula.
The rationale behind deviating from this notation is twofold. First, embedding the
classical logics with their semantics as its own “layer” in team logic allows to comfortably
build onto their proof systems. Second, Hilbert-style proof systems contain introduction
rules of the form 𝛼 ⊢ 𝛼, where 𝛼 is a tautology. We will show similar introduction rules
for all team-logical operators, and such introduction rules for the existential form of the
operators, i.e.,  and ♦ instead of ( and ∆, are simply unsound.
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(L1) 𝜙_ (𝜓 _ 𝜙)
(L2) (𝜙_ (𝜓 _ 𝜗)) _ (𝜙_ 𝜓) _ (𝜙_ 𝜗)
(L3) (∼𝜙_ ∼𝜓) _ (𝜓 _ 𝜙)
(L4) (𝛼→ 𝛽) _ (𝛼_ 𝛽)
(E_) 𝜙 𝜙_ 𝜓
𝜓
Figure 2 Hilbert-style axiomatization L of ℬ(ℱ).
3 Axioms of the Boolean closure
We begin the development of a proof system for team logic with the operators _ and ∼.
They are purely truth-functional; hence we can only reason about Boolean combinations of
classical formulas. The presented calculus for this is the system L (for lifted propositional
axioms) shown in Figure 2. The system L corresponds to the usual propositional axioms,
with exception of (L4) which relates the propositional and the material implication. In this
section it is shown how any complete proof system for a logic ℱ can be augmented with L to
obtain a complete system for ℬ(ℱ).
For the team-logical material implication _ a new modus ponens inference rule is
introduced. While the systems H0 and H can only be applied to classical formulas 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, . . .,
i.e., where no team-logical operators occur, the axioms and rules in L are permitted for
general team-logical formulas 𝜙,𝜓, 𝜗, . . ..
The proof of completeness of L is based on a generalized deduction theorem. The thought
behind this strategy is that the deduction theorem implies Lindenbaum’s lemma which allows
the construction of a maximal consistent set, the usual method for completeness proofs of
propositional axioms. We begin with identifying a family of proof systems which guarantee a
deduction theorem, extending the ideas of Hakli and Negri [5].
I Definition 3.1. Let 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼) be a calculus. Say that a rule ({𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑘}, 𝜓) ∈ 𝐼 has
weakening if { 𝜙_ 𝜉𝑖 | 𝑖 ∈ [𝑘] } ⊢ 𝜙_ 𝜓 for all 𝜙 ∈ 𝛯.
In other words, every derivation using an inference rule can also be proven under arbitrary
assumptions. Say that a calculus 𝛺 has weakening if all inference rules have weakening.
I Lemma 3.2. If 𝛺 ⪰ L and 𝛺 has weakening then it has the deduction theorem: 𝛷 ⊢ (𝜙_ 𝜓)
if and only if 𝛷 ∪ {𝜙} ⊢ 𝜓.
Proof. The direction from left to right is clear as L has (E_). From right to left we do an
induction over the length 𝑛 of a shortest proof of 𝜓. If 𝜓 ∈ 𝛷, 𝜓 = 𝜙, or if 𝜓 is an axiom,
then by (L1) and (E_) 𝛷 ⊢ (𝜙_ 𝜓). For 𝑛 = 1 these are the only cases. Let 𝑛 > 1. Then 𝜓
could be obtained by application of some inference rule ({𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑘}, 𝜓). 𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑘 all have
a proof of length ≤ 𝑛− 1 from 𝛷 ∪ {𝜙}, so by induction hypothesis 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙_ 𝜉𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ [𝑘].
By weakening 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙_ 𝜓. J
I Lemma 3.3 (Deduction theorem of L). If 𝛺 ⪰ L and all inference rules of 𝛺 except (E→)
and (E_) yield only theorems (i.e., formulas provable without assumptions), then 𝛺 has the
deduction theorem.
Proof. By the preceding lemma we can instead show that 𝛺 has weakening. If a formula
𝜓 produced by an inference rule is always a theorem, i.e., provable without assumptions,
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then by (L1) we can trivially prove 𝜉 _ 𝜓 for any 𝜉. Consider (E_). From the assumptions
𝜉 _ (𝜙 _ 𝜓) and 𝜉 _ 𝜙 just derive 𝜉 _ 𝜓 by (L2). For (E→), i.e., ({𝛼, 𝛼 → 𝛽}, 𝛽),
weakening is shown as follows: 𝜃 := 𝜉 _ (𝛼→ 𝛽)_ (𝛼_ 𝛽) is a theorem due to (L4) and
(L1). Apply (L2) twice on the formulas 𝜉 _ (𝛼→ 𝛽), 𝜃 and 𝜉 _ 𝛼 to obtain 𝜉 _ 𝛽. Hence
all rules have weakening. J
3.1 Completeness of the Boolean closure
The typical textbook proof of completeness of propositional or first-order logic uses Lin-
denbaum’s lemma to construct a maximal consistent set. For this we need the notion of
inconsistency.
I Definition 3.4. Let 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼) be a proof system. A set 𝛷 is 𝛺-inconsistent (or just
inconsistent) if 𝛷 ⊢ 𝛯. 𝛷 is 𝛺-consistent (or just consistent) if it is not 𝛺-inconsistent.
I Lemma 3.5. Let 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼), 𝛺 ⪰ L. The following statements are equivalent:
1. 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙 and 𝛷 ⊢ ∼𝜙 for some 𝜙,
2. 𝛷 is inconsistent,
3. 𝛷 ⊢ ⊥.
Proof. For 1. ⇒ 2. we have to show 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜉 for all 𝜉 ∈ 𝛯. First 𝛷 ⊢ (∼𝜉 _ ∼𝜙) follows from
𝛷 ⊢ ∼𝜙, (L1) and (E_); by (L3) and (E_) then follows 𝛷 ⊢ (𝜙 _ 𝜉), and again by (E_)
then 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜉. 3. is a special case of 2. For 3. ⇒ 1. it suffices to derive (𝜓 _ 𝜓) by a textbook
proof, since ⊥ := ∼(𝜓 _ 𝜓). J
I Lemma 3.6 (Relative consistency). Let 𝛺 ⪰ L have weakening and let 𝛷 be consistent.
Then 𝛷 0 𝜙 implies that 𝛷∪{∼𝜙} is consistent, and 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙 implies that 𝛷∪{𝜙} is consistent.
Proof. If 𝛷 0 𝜙 and 𝛷 ∪ {∼𝜙} was inconsistent, then 𝛷 ∪ {∼𝜙} ⊢ ∼𝜓 for any axiom 𝜓 and
thus by Lemma 3.2 𝛷 ⊢ (∼𝜙 _ ∼𝜓). By (L3) then 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜓,𝜓 _ 𝜙, so by (E_) 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙,
contradiction.
If 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙 and 𝛷 ∪ {𝜙} was inconsistent, then again 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙,𝜙 _ ⊥: contradiction to
consistency of 𝛷 and Lemma 3.5. J
I Definition 3.7. If 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼) then 𝛷 ⊆ 𝛯 is maximal consistent if it is consistent and
contains 𝜉 or ∼𝜉 for every 𝜉 ∈ 𝛯.
I Lemma 3.8 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). Let 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼), 𝛺 ⪰ L. If 𝛺 has weakening, then
every consistent set 𝛷 ⊆ 𝛯 has a maximal consistent superset 𝛷* ⊆ 𝛯.
Proof. Straightforward by enumerating all formulas and applying Lemma 3.6: For every
formula 𝜉, add either 𝜉 or ∼𝜉. See the appendix for details. J
The application of Lindenbaum’s lemma is usually as follows: If a set 𝛷 is maximal
consistent, then there is a model fulfilling all its atomic formulas. By the maximality of 𝛷
then one can inductively claim that also all Boolean combinations of atomic formulas in 𝛷
are automatically fulfilled as well. The main work here is required for the induction basis —
the model satisfying the atomic formulas. In our context, an “atom” is in fact any formula
of the underlying classical logic, in this case 𝒫ℒ orℳℒ. This additional complexity requires
the next property as an additional step to completeness.
I Definition 3.9. Let ℱ be a logic. ℱ admits counter-model merging if it has the following
property for arbitrary sets 𝛤,𝛥 ⊆ ℱ : If for every 𝛿 ∈ 𝛥 there is a valuation falsifying 𝛿 and
satisfying 𝛤 , then there is a valuation falsifying all formulas in 𝛥 and satisfying 𝛤 .
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I Lemma 3.10. 𝒫ℒ and ℳℒ, under team semantics, admit counter-model merging.
Proof. We prove only the ℳℒ case as 𝒫ℒ works similar. Let 𝛤,𝛥 ⊆ℳℒ. Assume for each
𝛿 ∈ 𝛥 a Kripke structure (𝒦𝛿, 𝑇𝛿) that falsifies 𝛿 and satisfies 𝛤 . Define K as the disjoint
union (see Goranko and Otto [3]) of all Kripke structures 𝒦𝛿. Then (K, 𝑇𝛿)  𝛤 , (K, 𝑇𝛿) 2 𝛿
as ℳℒ is invariant under disjoint union of structures [3] and due to flatness of ℳℒ. Define
the team 𝒯 := ⋃︀𝛿∈𝛥 𝑇𝛿. As ℳℒ is union closed (Proposition 2.4), (K, 𝒯 ) satisfies 𝛤 , and as
it is downwards closed (Proposition 2.3), it falsifies each 𝛿 ∈ 𝛥. J
I Definition 3.11. A calculus 𝛺 is refutation complete for ℒ if for every unsatisfiable 𝛷 ⊆ ℒ
there is a 𝜙 s. t. 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙,∼𝜙.
Write ∼ℱ for the fragment of ℬ(ℱ) restricted to the formulas { ∼𝜙 | 𝜙 ∈ ℱ }.
I Lemma 3.12. If ℱ has counter-model merging and 𝛺 is complete for ℱ , then 𝛺 is
refutation complete for ℱ ∪ ∼ℱ .
Proof. Let a set 𝛷 ⊆ ℱ∪∼ℱ be unsatisfiable. Abbreviate 𝛤 := 𝛷∩ℱ and 𝛥 := 𝛷∩∼ℱ . It is
not the case that 𝛤 ∪{∼𝛿} is satisfiable for every ∼𝛿 ∈ 𝛥, because then 𝛷 would be satisfiable
by counter-model merging. Hence for some ∼𝛿 ∈ 𝛥 the set 𝛤 ∪ {∼𝛿} is unsatisfiable, i.e.,
𝛤  𝛿. But then 𝛤 ⊢ 𝛿 due to the completeness of 𝛺 for ℱ , so 𝛷 ⊢ 𝛿,∼𝛿. J
Let us emphasize again the difference to classical logics, say, 𝒫ℒ: 𝒫ℒ has 𝒫𝒮 as its atoms,
and the analogously defined fragment 𝒫𝒮 ∪ ¬𝒫𝒮 of 𝒫ℒ is trivially “refutation complete”: A
set 𝛤 ⊆ 𝒫𝒮 ∪ ¬𝒫𝒮 is contradictory if and only if contains 𝑝,¬𝑝 for some proposition 𝑝, so
there is nothing to do for a proof system. This is different for team logics.
After the atoms are handled correctly by the proof system (by refutation completeness of
ℱ ∪ ∼ℱ), the induction step goes just for classical logic, and then results in completeness of
ℬ(ℱ).
I Lemma 3.13. If 𝛺 ⪰ L is refutation complete for ℱ ∪∼ℱ and has the deduction theorem,
then 𝛺 is refutation complete for ℬ(ℱ).
Proof. We must show that every unsatisfiable 𝛷 ⊆ ℬ(ℱ) allows deriving 𝜙 and ∼𝜙 for some
𝜙, or, equivalently due to Lemma 3.5, that it is inconsistent. We prove for contraposition
that every consistent 𝛷 ⊆ ℬ(ℱ) has a model.
If 𝛷 is consistent, then it has a maximal consistent superset 𝛷* by Lemma 3.8. Certainly
𝛷* ∩ (ℱ ∪ ∼ℱ) is consistent as well, and by refutation completeness it has a model 𝒜. We
show that 𝜓 ∈ 𝛷* ⇔ 𝒜  𝜓 for all 𝜓 ∈ ℬ(ℱ) (then 𝛷* and in particular 𝛷 is satisfiable).
The rest of the proof will be an induction over the length of 𝜓. Let 𝜓 ∈ ℱ . If 𝜓 ∈ 𝛷*,
then 𝒜  𝜓 by definition of 𝒜. If 𝜓 /∈ 𝛷*, then ∼𝜓 ∈ 𝛷* due to the maximality of 𝛷*, so
∼𝜓 ∈ 𝛷* ∩ ∼ℱ , and again 𝒜  ∼𝜓 by the definition of 𝒜, hence 𝒜 2 𝜓 by definition of ∼.
The induction step 𝜓 = ∼𝜗 is clear due to the consistency and maximality of 𝛷*.
So let 𝜓 = 𝜓1 _ 𝜓2. Assume 𝜓 ∈ 𝛷*. Then either 𝜓1 /∈ 𝛷* or ∼𝜓2 /∈ 𝛷*, otherwise
by modus ponens 𝛷* is inconsistent. But then either 𝒜 2 𝜓1 or 𝒜  𝜓2 by induction
hypothesis, hence 𝒜  𝜓1 _ 𝜓2. If 𝜓 /∈ 𝛷*, then ∼𝜓 ∈ 𝛷*. If now 𝒜  𝜓2, then 𝜓2 ∈ 𝛷* by
induction hypothesis. From 𝜓2 we can derive 𝜓 via (L1). If 𝒜  ∼𝜓1, then ∼𝜓1 ∈ 𝛷*. From
∼𝜓1 we can infer ∼𝜓2 _ ∼𝜓1 again with (L1) and by contraposition (L3) we obtain the
conditional 𝜓. But in both cases 𝛷 would then be inconsistent, so 𝒜  𝜓1 and 𝒜 2 𝜓2, hence
𝒜 2 𝜓1 _ 𝜓2. J
I Theorem 3.14 (Completeness of L). If 𝛺 ⪰ L is refutation complete for ℱ ∪ ∼ℱ and has
the deduction theorem, then it is complete for ℬ(ℱ).
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(𝛼 𝛽) ] (𝛼 ∨ 𝛽) (F) Flatness 1.
𝛼_ (𝜙( 𝛼) (F() Flatness 2.
𝜙_ (𝜙( 𝜓) _ (𝜗( 𝜓) (Lax) Splitting is lax.
(𝜙( 𝜓( 𝜗) _ (𝜓( 𝜙( 𝜗) (Ex() Exchange of hypotheses.
(𝜙( ∼𝜓) _ (𝜓( ∼𝜙) (C() Contraposition.
(𝜙( (𝜓 _ 𝜗)) _ (𝜙( 𝜓) _ (𝜙( 𝜗) (Dis() Distribution axiom
𝜙 (𝜙 theorem)
𝜓( 𝜙 (Nec() “Necessitation”
Figure 3 The splitting axioms S.
Proof. Let 𝛷 ⊆ ℬ(ℱ) and 𝜙 ∈ ℬ(ℱ). We have to show that from 𝛷  𝜙 it follows 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙.
Assume for contraposition that 𝛷 0 𝜙. Then 𝛷 is consistent by definition, and due to
Lemma 3.6 so is 𝛷∪{∼𝜙} as well. By Lemma 3.13 𝛺 is refutation complete for ℬ(ℱ). Hence
the consistent set 𝛷 ∪ {∼𝜙} must be satisfiable which implies 𝛷 2 𝜙. J
I Corollary 3.15. H0L is complete for ℬ(𝒫ℒ). HL is complete for ℬ(ℳℒ).
Proof. Follows from Corollary 2.2, Lemma 3.3, 3.10 and 3.12 and Theorem 3.14. J
Independently it can be shown that the axioms L can already derive all important Boolean
tautologies, like De Morgan’s laws, commutative, distributive laws and associative laws [12].
4 The axioms of splitting
In the previous sections we considered classical logics in the setting of team semantics, and
their closure under the Boolean operators of team logic. With these operators we can express
in essence three facts: The existence of certain members in the team, the absence of other
members in the team, and further Boolean combinations thereof.
An essential addition to team semantics is the previously introduced splitting disjunction, or sometimes splitjunction or tensor. The expression 𝜙 𝜓 can be seen as a per-member
decision for either 𝜙, 𝜓, or, as in the classical disjunction, both. This is called lax semantics.
In the strict semantics the two subteams of the division may not overlap; so the strict 
is better seen as a member-wise “exclusive or”. In this work we will only consider the lax
semantics as defined in Section 2.
The non-truth-functional nature of splitting disjunction is an obstacle to axiomatizability;
our strategy here is to consider it as a special type of (axiomatizable) modality.
It was shown by Yang [16] that 𝒫𝒯 ℒ formulas are equivalent to ∼-free formulas except
that the atom of non-emptiness (ne := ∼⊥) occurs. A little informally we can call this
fragment 𝒮+(𝒫ℒ ∪ ne) here. Her argumentation for this equivalence is however model-
theoretic and not syntactical. With the system S in Figure 3 we get a similar result for
ℬ(𝒫ℒ), but in a purely syntactical way:
I Theorem 4.1. Every 𝒫𝒯 ℒ formula is provably equivalent to a ℬ(𝒫ℒ) formula.
This result will be proven in this section. The completeness is then just a consequence of
the completeness of ℬ(𝒫ℒ), i.e., Corollary 3.15.
Note that the matter is not so easy for strict splitting semantics. For instance the formula
ne 7 ∼(ne  ne) is true in strict semantics if and only if the team contains exactly one
element.
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I Proposition 4.2. There is no finite set 𝛷 ⊆ ℬ(𝒫ℒ) that is equivalent to ne7∼(ne ne)
in strict semantics.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there was some finite 𝛷 ⊆ ℬ(𝒫ℒ) as above.
W.l.o.g. the variable 𝑥 does not occur in 𝛷. Let 𝑇  𝛷, then 𝑇 = {𝑠} for some assignment
𝑠. It can be easily shown by induction over the length of formulas that {𝑠𝑥0 , 𝑠𝑥1}  𝛷, where
𝑠𝑥𝑐 (𝑥) = 𝑐 and 𝑠𝑥𝑐 (𝑦) = 𝑠(𝑦) for 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦. J
One remark about the naming of the “necessitation” rule in Figure 3. This rule is similar
to the rule used in modal logic. In the context of teams, a subteam can as well be seen as
a type of “other world”. We can, as typical for modal logics, derive no knowledge about 𝜓
in a subteam from knowledge about 𝜓 in the current team. Instead we can see team logics
as logics with countable many modalities of the form “𝜙(” and introduce corresponding
necessitation and distribution rules.
I Proposition 4.3. The proof system H0LS is sound for 𝒫𝒯 ℒ.
Proof. The soundness of H0 is clear as instances of its axioms may only be 𝒫ℒ formulas
and H0 is sound for 𝒫ℒ. The soundness of L is clear as well. So consider the axioms
and rules introduced in S: The soundness of (F() and (F) is due to downward closure
(Proposition 2.3) and flatness (Proposition 2.5). (Lax) follows from the definition of splitting,
and (Ex() and (C() can easily be proven by contradiction. The necessitation rule (Nec()
and the distribution axiom (Dis() are as in modal logic, just with the pseudo-modality
𝜓(. (Nec() is applied to 𝜙 only if 𝜙 is a theorem, i.e., ⊢ 𝜙. Its soundness follows therefore
straightforwardly by induction over the proof length. J
4.1 Completeness of propositional team logic
The proof of Theorem 4.1, the collapse of propositional team logic to the Boolean closure,
will be built on several lemmas and the following meta-rules.
I Lemma 4.4. If a proof system 𝛺 has the deduction theorem, then it admits the following
meta-rules:
If 𝛺 ⪰ L: Reductio ad absurdum (RAA): 𝛷 ∪ { 𝜙} ⊢ 𝜓,∼𝜓 ⇒ 𝛷 ⊢ ∼𝜙 and
𝛷 ∪ {∼𝜙} ⊢ 𝜓,∼𝜓 ⇒ 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙.
If 𝛺 ⪰ LS: Modus ponens in ( (MP(): ⊢ 𝜙_ 𝜓, 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜗( 𝜙 ⇒ 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜗( 𝜓.
If 𝛺 ⪰ LS: Modus ponens in  (MP): ⊢ 𝜙_ 𝜓, 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜗 𝜙 ⇒ 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜗 𝜓.
Proof. Only a few applications of the deduction theorem and the axioms are required, see
the appendix for details. J
The next definition is required since our strategy of(-elimination starts at the innermost
subformulas. Equivalent subformulas can always be substituted in compositional semantics,
but we still have to show that H0LS proves these substitutions as well.
I Definition 4.5. Let f be an 𝑛-ary connective. Say that a proof system 𝛺 has substitution
in f if 𝜙𝑖 ⊣⊢ 𝜓𝑖 f. a. 𝑖 ∈ [𝑛] implies f(𝜙1, . . . , 𝜙𝑛) ⊣⊢ f(𝜓1, . . . , 𝜓𝑛).
Note that due to symmetry it suffices to prove only f(𝜙1, . . . , 𝜙𝑛) ⊢ f(𝜓1, . . . , 𝜓𝑛) to show
substitution in f.
I Lemma 4.6. If 𝛺 ⪰ LS has the deduction theorem, then it has substitution in ∼, _ and
(.
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(𝜙 𝜓) ] (𝜓  𝜙) (Com) Commutative law for 
((𝜙 𝜓) 𝜗) ] (𝜙 (𝜓  𝜗)) (Ass) Associative law for 
𝛼7 (𝜙 𝜓) ] (𝛼7 𝜙) (𝛼7 𝜓) (D7) Distributive law for  and 7
𝜙 (𝜓 6 𝜗) ] (𝜙 𝜓)6 (𝜙 𝜗) (D6) Distributive law for  and 6
(𝜙 𝜓)7 (𝜙( 𝜗) _ (𝜙 (𝜓 7 𝜗)) (Aug)
(E𝛼 𝜙) _ E𝛼 (Abs) Absorption law of 
(𝛼7 E𝛽) _ E(𝛼 ∧ 𝛽) (JoinE)
(𝜙 (𝛼7 E𝛽)) ] (𝜙 𝛼)7 E(𝛼 ∧ 𝛽) (IsolateE)
Figure 4 Auxiliary theorems S′ of splitting.
Proof. Let 𝜙 = 𝜉1 _ 𝜉2, 𝜉1 ⊣⊢ 𝜓1 and 𝜉2 ⊣⊢ 𝜓2. Then {𝜓1, 𝜙} ⊢ 𝜉2 in L and hence
{𝜓1, 𝜙} ⊢ 𝜓2. By the deduction theorem 𝜙 ⊢ 𝜓1 _ 𝜓2. Let 𝜙 = ∼𝜉 and 𝜉 ⊣⊢ 𝜓. Obviously
{𝜙,𝜓} ⊢ 𝜉,∼𝜉 in L. By Lemma 4.4 (RAA) is derivable, so we obtain 𝜙 ⊢ ∼𝜓. The( case is
proven with applications of (MP() and (C(). J
If 𝛼 is a classical formula, in the following write E𝛼 as an abbreviation for ∼¬𝛼. The
meaning of E𝛼 is intuitively that at least one element in the current team satisfies 𝛼 (in
particular E𝛼 implies ne).
I Lemma 4.7 ([12]). Let 𝛺 ⪰ H0LS have the deduction theorem. Then 𝛺 proves the theorems
S′ (see Figure 4).
We formally describe the translation from 𝒫𝒯 ℒ to ℬ(𝒫ℒ) as(-elimination. The proof is
a step-wise translation with the help of the following lemmas. We implicitly use Lemma 4.6
which permits derivations applied to subformulas inside_,∼ and(, as well as the meta-rules
in Lemma 4.4 and the theorems in Lemma 4.7.
I Lemma 4.8. If 𝛺 has the deduction theorem and 𝛺 ⪰ H0LS, then the following formulas
are theorems of 𝛺:
𝑛7
𝑖=1
E𝛽𝑖 ] 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=1
E𝛽𝑖 (1)
𝛼7(︃ 𝑛7
𝑖=1
E𝛽𝑖
)︃] 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=1
(𝛼7 E𝛽𝑖) (2)
𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=1
(𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) ] (︃ 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=1
𝛼𝑖
)︃7 𝑛7
𝑖=1
E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖) (3)
Proof. The proof of_ for (1) is by induction over 𝑛. 𝑛 = 1 is clear, so let 𝑛 > 1. By induction
hypothesis we can assume that
⨂︀𝑛−1
𝑖=1 E𝛽𝑖 and E𝛽𝑛 are derivable from7𝑛𝑖=1 E𝛽𝑖. For sake
of contradiction take
⨂︀𝑛−1
𝑖=1 E𝛽𝑖( ∼E𝛽𝑛 as assumption; by (Lax) derive (⊤( ∼E𝛽𝑛), by
(C() then (E𝛽𝑛( ∼⊤) and by (Lax) (⊤( ∼⊤). But certainly ⊤∨⊤ is a theorem of H0LS
and hence ⊤⊤ due to F. This is a contradiction, so (RAA) yields ∼ (⨂︀𝑛𝑖=1 E𝛽𝑖( ∼E𝛽𝑛),
i.e.,
⨂︀𝑛
𝑖=1 E𝛽𝑖. The theorems (Abs), (Ass) and (Com) are used to derive each conjunct
for ^ (1).
For (2) first apply (1) to substitute7𝑛𝑖=1 E𝛽𝑖, then distribute 𝛼 with repeated application
of (D7), (Ass) and (Com). The reverse direction is possible as both steps are symmetric.
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Consider (3). From
⨂︀𝑛
𝑖=1 (𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) we obtain⨂︀𝑛𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 by (Ass), (Com) and (MP)
as (𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) _ 𝛼𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑛]. Apply (JoinE) to also derive ⨂︀𝑛𝑖=1 E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖) the same
way, and by (1) then7𝑛𝑖=1 E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖).
For the other implication we repeatedly apply the theorem (IsolateE), i.e., (𝜙  𝛼) 7
E(𝛼 ∧ 𝛽)_ 𝜙 (𝛼7 E𝛽) as follows: Assume that the formula has the following form after 𝑘
applications.(︃
𝑘⨂︁
𝑖=1
(𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=𝑘+1
𝛼𝑖
)︃7 𝑛7
𝑖=𝑘+1
E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖).
For 𝑘 = 0 this is indeed the case. With commutative and associative laws we isolate a single
subformula on each side:[︃(︃
𝑘⨂︁
𝑖=1
(𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=𝑘+2
𝛼𝑖
)︃ 𝛼𝑘+1]︃7 E(𝛼𝑘+1 ∧ 𝛽𝑘+1)7 𝑛7
𝑖=𝑘+2
E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖)
Then we apply the theorem on the left two conjuncts, resulting in[︃(︃
𝑘⨂︁
𝑖=1
(𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=𝑘+2
𝛼𝑖
)︃ (𝛼𝑘+1 7 E𝛽𝑘+1)]︃7 𝑛7
𝑖=𝑘+2
E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖)
and again with commutative and associative laws in(︃
𝑘+1⨂︁
𝑖=1
(𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖) 𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=𝑘+2
𝛼𝑖
)︃7 𝑛7
𝑖=𝑘+2
E(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖)
so that we arrive at the same form again and repeat the steps. J
I Lemma 4.9 (Flatness Properties). If 𝛺 has the deduction theorem and 𝛺 ⪰ H0LS, then
the following formulas are theorems of 𝛺:
𝑛⨂︁
𝑖=1
𝛼𝑖 ] 𝑛⋁︁
𝑖=1
𝛼𝑖 (4)
𝑛7
𝑖=1
𝛼𝑖 ] 𝑛⋀︁
𝑖=1
𝛼𝑖 (5)
Proof. (4): By induction over 𝑛. The case 𝑛 = 1 is trivial. For 𝑛 > 1 let 𝜙 :=
⨂︀𝑛−1
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖
and 𝛾 :=
⋁︀𝑛−1
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 be given as assumptions. By induction hypothesis 𝜙 ⊣⊢ 𝛾. Then
𝜙𝛼𝑛 ⊣⊢ 𝛾𝛼𝑛 by (Com) and (MP), and by (F) we obtain 𝜙𝛼𝑛 ⊣⊢ 𝛾𝛼𝑛 ⊣⊢ 𝛾∨𝛼𝑛
and hence (4).
(5): Again by induction, so let 𝜙 := 7𝑛−1𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾 := ⋀︀𝑛−1𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 be given such that
𝜙 ⊣⊢ 𝛾. Then 𝜙7 𝛼𝑛 ⊣⊢ 𝛾 7 𝛼𝑛 in L. To obtain 𝜙7 𝛼𝑛 ⊣⊢ 𝛾 7 𝛼𝑛 ⊣⊢ 𝛾 ∧ 𝛼𝑛 we prove the
general theorem 𝛼 ∧ 𝛽 ⊣⊢ 𝛼7 𝛽 for classical 𝛼, 𝛽. Clearly 𝛼 ∧ 𝛽 proves 𝛼 and 𝛽 in H0 and
thus 𝛼7𝛽 in H0L. To prove 𝛼∧𝛽 from 𝛼7𝛽 we use (RAA), i.e., assume 𝛼7𝛽 and ∼(𝛼∧𝛽).
It holds (𝛼∧ 𝛽) ⊣⊢ ¬(𝛼→ ¬𝛽) in H0, so we derive E(𝛼→ ¬𝛽) from ∼(𝛼∧ 𝛽). Via L and the
theorem (JoinE) we obtain in two steps first E(𝛼 ∧ (𝛼→ ¬𝛽)) and then E(𝛽 ∧ 𝛼 ∧ (𝛼→ ¬𝛽))
which turns into E⊥ in H0L. But E⊥ = ∼¬⊥ proves ⊥, contradiction. J
With the above lemmas we are ready to state the full translation from 𝒫𝒯 ℒ to ℬ(𝒫ℒ).
I Definition 4.10. Let ℱ be a logic. Let 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼) be a proof system. Let f be a
connective of arity 𝑛. We say that ℬ(ℱ) has f-elimination in 𝛺 if the following holds for
all formulas 𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑛 ∈ 𝛯: If for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑛] there is 𝜉′𝑖 ∈ ℬ(ℱ) s. t. 𝜉𝑖 ⊣⊢ 𝜉′𝑖, then also
f(𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑛) ⊣⊢ 𝜙 for some 𝜙 ∈ ℬ(ℱ).
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In other words: If 𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑛 have provably equivalent ℬ(ℱ) formulas, then so has f(𝜉1, . . . , 𝜉𝑛).
I Lemma 4.11 ((-elimination). Let ℱ be a logic closed under ¬,∨,∧. Let 𝛺 be a proof
system with the deduction theorem s. t. 𝛺 ⪰ H0LS. Then ℬ(ℱ) has (-elimination in 𝛺.
Proof. Let 𝜙 = 𝜓 ( 𝜗. Let 𝜓′, 𝜗′ ∈ ℬ(ℱ) such that 𝜓 ⊣⊢ 𝜓′ and 𝜗 ⊣⊢ 𝜗′. It holds
𝜗′ ⊣⊢ ∼∼𝜗′ in L. Lemma 4.6 applies to 𝛺, so by substitution in ( we can translate
𝜙 := 𝜓( 𝜗 to 𝜓′( ∼∼𝜗′, and therefore in L to ∼∼(𝜓′( ∼∼𝜗′) = ∼(𝜓′ ∼𝜗′).
In the system L we can apply De Morgan’s laws and distributive laws on both 𝜓′ and
∼𝜗′. We can therefore derive two formulas 𝜓′′, 𝜗′′ in disjunctive normal form (DNF) over7,6; and obtain with substitution in ∼ and( the following equivalent form of 𝜙, where all
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, . . . ∈ ℱ :
∼
⎡⎣ 𝑛6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑜𝑖7
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑚𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠  𝑛′6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑜′𝑖7
𝑗=1
𝛼′𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑚
′
𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽′𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠⎤⎦
That the negative literals can be represented with E prefix is due to H0 proving ¬¬ introduc-
tion, thus ∼𝛽 ⊣⊢ ∼¬¬𝛽 = E¬𝛽 for any 𝛽. Apply the following derivation in H0LS:
Lemma 4.9 (5) ⊣⊢ ∼
⎡⎣ 𝑛6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝𝛼𝑖 7 𝑚𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠  𝑛′6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝𝛼′𝑖 7 𝑚
′
𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽′𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠⎤⎦ (𝛼𝑖, 𝛼′𝑖 ∈ ℱ)
(D6)
(Com)
(Ass) ⊣⊢ ∼ 61≤𝑖≤𝑛
1≤𝑖′≤𝑛′
⎛⎝𝛼𝑖 7 𝑚𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠
⎛⎝𝛼′𝑖′ 7 𝑚
′
𝑖′7
𝑗=1
E𝛽′𝑖′,𝑗
⎞⎠
Lemma 4.8 (2) ⊣⊢ ∼ 6
1≤𝑖≤𝑛
1≤𝑖′≤𝑛′
⎛⎝ 𝑚𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
(︂
𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖,𝑗)︂ 𝑚
′
𝑖′⨂︁
𝑗=1
(︂
𝛼′𝑖′ 7 E𝛽′𝑖′,𝑗)︂
⎞⎠
(Renaming) ⊣⊢ ∼
ℓ6
𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
(𝛾𝑖,𝑗 7 E𝛿𝑖,𝑗)
Lemma 4.8 (3) ⊣⊢ ∼
ℓ6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
𝛾𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑘𝑖7
𝑗=1
E (𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∧ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗)
⎞⎠
Lemma 4.9 (4) ⊣⊢ ∼
ℓ6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑘𝑖⋁︁
𝑗=1
𝛾𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑘𝑖7
𝑗=1
E (𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∧ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗)
⎞⎠ =: 𝜙′ ∈ ℬ(ℱ). J
I Theorem 4.12. Every 𝒫𝒯 ℒ formula is provably equivalent to a ℬ(𝒫ℒ) formula in H0LS.
Proof. Let 𝜙 ∈ 𝒫𝒯 ℒ. We show derivability of an equivalent 𝜙′ ∈ ℬ(𝒫ℒ) by induction over
|𝜙|. So assume 𝜙 /∈ ℬ(𝒫ℒ). If 𝜙 = 𝜓 _ 𝜗 or 𝜙 = ∼𝜓 then we have only to apply the
induction hypothesis to 𝜓 and 𝜗 and substitute in the sense of Lemma 4.6. The remaining
case is 𝜙 = 𝜓( 𝜗 for which we apply the previous lemma. J
I Lemma 4.13. Let ℱ ,ℒ be logics, ℬ(ℱ) ⊆ ℒ, s. t. every ℒ formula is provably equivalent to
a ℬ(ℱ) formula in 𝛺. If 𝛺 is complete for ℬ(ℱ) and sound for ℒ, then 𝛺 is complete for ℒ.
Proof. Assume 𝛷 ⊆ ℒ, 𝜙 ∈ ℒ. For completeness we have to show that 𝛷  𝜙 implies 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙
in 𝛺. By assumption every ℒ formula is provably equivalent to a ℬ(ℱ) formula, so 𝛷 ⊣⊢ 𝛷′
for some set 𝛷′ ⊆ ℬ(ℱ). Similar 𝜙 ⊣⊢ 𝜙′ for some 𝜙′ ∈ ℬ(ℱ).
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By soundness it holds 𝛷 ≡ 𝛷′ and 𝜙 ≡ 𝜙′, so 𝛷′  𝜙′ follows. By completeness of 𝛺 for
ℬ(ℱ) we have 𝛷′ ⊢ 𝜙′, and so 𝛷 ⊢ 𝛷′ ⊢ 𝜙′ ⊢ 𝜙. The lemma follows as ⊢ is transitive. J
I Theorem 4.14. The proof system H0LS is sound and complete for 𝒫𝒯 ℒ.
Proof. For soundness see Proposition 4.3. H0L is complete for ℬ(𝒫ℒ) due to Corollary 3.15.
By soundness, Theorem 4.12, and Lemma 4.13 we obtain completeness for 𝒫𝒯 ℒ. J
It follows that axiomatizations of 𝒫𝒯 ℒ-definable constraints, like dependence, indepen-
dence and inclusion over Boolean relations, can automatically be found in the presented
proof system. For instance the dependency atom =(𝑥, 𝑦) (“𝑦 is a function of 𝑥”) can be
written as ⊤( (=(𝑥)_ =(𝑦)), where =(𝑝) := 𝑝6 ¬𝑝.
I Example 4.15. We give a proof of Armstrong’s axiom of transitivity of functional depen-
dence [1]. The axiom says the following: From =(𝑥, 𝑦) and =(𝑦, 𝑧) infer =(𝑥, 𝑧). A proof
sketch follows.
A =(𝑥, 𝑦)
B =(𝑦, 𝑧)
1 (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑦)) _ ((=(𝑦) _ =(𝑧)) _ (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑧))) L
2 ⊤(
(︀
(=(𝑥) _ =(𝑦)) _ ((=(𝑦) _ =(𝑧)) _ (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑧))))︀ Nec( (1)
3
(︀
⊤( (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑦)))︀_(︀
⊤( ((=(𝑦) _ =(𝑧)) _ (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑧))))︀ Dis( + E_ (2)
4 ⊤( ((=(𝑦) _ =(𝑧)) _ (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑧)))) E_ (A + 3)
5
(︀
⊤( (=(𝑦) _ =(𝑧)))︀_ (︀⊤( (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑧)))︀ Dis( + E_ (4)
6 ⊤( (=(𝑥) _ =(𝑧)) E_ (B + 5)
=(𝑥, 𝑧)
I Example 4.16. The formula (𝛼( 𝛽)_ 𝛽 is valid for all 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ 𝒫ℒ: 𝛼 is satisfied by the
empty team, and as for every team 𝑇 there is a division into ∅∪𝑇 , the team 𝑇 should satisfy
𝛽. We sketch a proof in the system H0LS: It holds H0 ⊢ ⊥ → 𝛼, thus H0LS ⊢ ∼𝛼 _ ∼⊥.
From ∼𝛼_ ∼⊥ and 𝛼( 𝛽 it follows ⊥( 𝛽 by (C() and (MP(), hence ∼𝛽( ∼⊥. To
prove 𝛽 now we assume ∼𝛽 for (RAA). From ∼𝛽 and ∼𝛽 ( ∼⊥ we obtain ⊤ ( ∼⊥ by
(Lax) which contradicts ⊤  ⊥ := ∼(⊤ ( ∼⊥), but ⊤  ⊥ follows from H0 ⊢ ⊤ ∨ ⊥ and
(F).
5 Modal team logic
In modal team logic we have team-wide modalities to relate teams of worlds in Kripke
structures to each other. As for the splitting operator, we axiomatize the modalities just
enough so that we can eliminate them. Kontinen, Müller, Schnoor and Vollmer [9] proved that
every ℳ𝒯 ℒ formula is equivalent to an ℬ(ℳℒ) formula. But as with Yang’s argument we
improve this result by giving a purely syntactical derivation procedure which does not rely on
model-theoretic aspects. Together with Corollary 3.15 this yields a complete axiomatization
for ℳ𝒯 ℒ, settling an open question of Kontinen et al. [9].
I Proposition 5.1. The proof system HLSM is sound for ℳ𝒯 ℒ.
Proof. For H see Corollary 2.2 and for LS see the proof of Proposition 4.3. The axioms
and rules of M can be verified from the definition of ℳ𝒯 ℒ, their soundness is shown in the
appendix. J
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∼𝜙] ∼𝜙 (Lin)  is linear.
♦𝛼] ¬¬𝛼 (F♦) Flatness of ♦.
♦(𝜙 𝜓) ] ♦𝜙 ♦𝜓 (D♦) ♦ distributes over splitting.
𝛼_ ∆𝛼 (E) Successors are subteams of image team.
♦𝜙_ (∆𝜓 _ 𝜓) (I) Image is a successor if one exists.
(𝜙_ 𝜓) _ (𝜙_ 𝜓) (Dis) Distribution axiom
∆(𝜙_ 𝜓) _ (∆𝜙_ ∆𝜓) (Dis∆) Distribution axiom
𝜙 (𝜙 theorem)𝜙 (Nec) Necessitation
𝜙 (𝜙 theorem)
∆𝜙
(Nec∆) Necessitation
Figure 5 The modal team logic axioms M.
(𝜙_ 𝜓) ] (𝜙_ 𝜓) (D_) Distributive law for  and _
♦(𝜙6 𝜓) ] (♦𝜙6 ♦𝜓) (D♦6) Distributive law for ♦ and 6
♦(𝛼7 E𝛽) ] ♦𝛼7 E¬¬(𝛼 ∧ 𝛽) (♦IsolateE)
Figure 6 Auxiliary theorems M′ for modalities.
I Lemma 5.2. HLSM has substitution in _,∼,(, and ∆.
Proof. HLSM has the deduction theorem due to Lemma 3.3, so the first three cases follow
from Lemma 4.6. The cases 𝜙 = 𝜉 and 𝜙 = ∆𝜉 are easily shown with (Nec), (Dis),
(Nec∆) and (Dis∆). J
I Lemma 5.3 ([12]). HLSM proves the theorems M′ (see Figure 6).
I Lemma 5.4. ℬ(ℳℒ) has -elimination in HLM.
Proof. Transform the argument of  applying Lemma 5.2, the rest follows immediately from
the axiom (Lin) as well as the distributive law (D_): Just push the  inwards until it
precedes only classical ℳℒ subformulas. J
I Lemma 5.5. ℬ(ℳℒ) has ∆-elimination in HLSM.
Proof. Let ∆𝜙 be given s. t. 𝜙 ⊣⊢ 𝜙′ for 𝜙′ ∈ ℬ(ℳℒ). With L and Lemma 5.2 we can prove
∆𝜙 equivalent to ∼∼∆∼∼𝜙′ = ∼♦∼𝜙′. Again in L we can apply De Morgan’s laws and
distributive laws on ∼𝜙′ such that it is provably equivalent to a formula in DNF:
𝑛6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑜𝑖7
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑘𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠
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Then ∆𝜙 itself is provably equivalent to:
∼♦
𝑛6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑜𝑖7
𝑗=1
𝛼𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑘𝑖7
𝑗=1
E𝛽𝑖,𝑗
⎞⎠
Lemma 4.8, 4.9 ⊣⊢ ∼♦
𝑛6
𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
(︂
𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖,𝑗)︂ where 𝛼𝑖 ∈ℳℒ
(D♦6), (D♦) ⊣⊢ ∼ 𝑛6
𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
♦ (𝛼𝑖 7 E𝛽𝑖,𝑗)
Lemma 5.3 ⊣⊢ ∼
𝑛6
𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
(♦𝛼𝑖 7 E¬¬(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗))
(F♦) ⊣⊢ ∼
𝑛6
𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
(¬¬𝛼𝑖 7 E¬¬(𝛼𝑖 ∧ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗))
(Renaming) ⊣⊢ ∼
𝑛6
𝑖=1
𝑘𝑖⨂︁
𝑗=1
(𝜇𝑖,𝑗 7 E𝜈𝑖,𝑗) where 𝜇𝑖,𝑗 , 𝜈𝑖,𝑗 ∈ℳℒ
Lemma 4.8, 4.9 ⊣⊢ ∼
ℓ6
𝑖=1
⎛⎝ 𝑘𝑖⋁︁
𝑗=1
𝜇𝑖,𝑗 7 𝑘𝑖7
𝑗=1
E (𝜇𝑖,𝑗 ∧ 𝜈𝑖,𝑗)
⎞⎠ ∈ ℬ(ℳℒ). J
I Theorem 5.6. Everyℳ𝒯 ℒ formula is provably equivalent to a ℬ(ℳℒ) formula in HLSM.
Proof. Proven by induction as in Theorem 4.12, applying Lemma 4.11, 5.4 and 5.5. J
I Theorem 5.7. The proof system HLSM is sound and complete for ℳ𝒯 ℒ.
Proof. For the soundness see Proposition 5.1. The completeness follows from soundness,
Corollary 3.15, Lemma 4.13 and Theorem 5.6. J
6 Conclusion
The team-semantical extensions of propositional logic 𝒫ℒ and modal logic ℳℒ, i.e., 𝒫𝒯 ℒ
and ℳ𝒯 ℒ, have been shown axiomatizable. Their property to collapse to the Boolean
closures of their flat base logics, i.e., ℬ(𝒫ℒ) and ℬ(ℳℒ), allows a completeness proof for the
given proof systems.
An important detail there is the use of lax semantics for the operators  and ♦. It is
possible to use strict semantics, i.e., to define team divisions via partitions; and to choose
exactly one successor of worlds for ♦ (see Hella et al. [6]). The semantics of  would then
allow to count certain elements in the team. The strictness of ♦ can be chosen accordingly:
It distributes over  if and only if both are strict or both are lax.
But even if we recover the distributive laws at this point — counting cannot be expressed
in the ℬ(·) closure (see Proposition 4.2), so there can be no completeness proof based on full
operator elimination as in the style of this paper. It is open how complete axiomatizations
can be found for team logics strictly stronger than ℬ(·).
Acknowledgements. I thank Anselm Haak and Juha Kontinen for various comments, hints
and for pointing out helpful references. I also thank the anonymous referees for their useful
hints and corrections.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.8 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). Let 𝛷 be consistent, 𝛺 = (𝛯,𝛹, 𝐼). We can
write the countable set 𝛯 as 𝛯 := {𝜉1, 𝜉2, . . .}.
Let 𝛷0 := 𝛷, and for each 𝑖 ≥ 1 define 𝛷𝑖 as
𝛷𝑖 :=
{︃
𝛷𝑖−1 ∪ {𝜉𝑖} if 𝛷𝑖−1 ⊢ {𝜉𝑖},
𝛷𝑖−1 ∪ {∼𝜉𝑖} otherwise.
By Lemma 3.6 the consistency of 𝛷𝑖−1 implies that of 𝛷𝑖. Hence by induction all 𝛷𝑛
for 𝑛 ≥ 0 are consistent. Let 𝛷* := ⋃︀𝑛≥0 𝛷𝑛. 𝛷* is again consistent, otherwise it could
prove ⊥ already from a finite set 𝛷𝑛 of assumptions, which would be a contradiction to the
consistency of all 𝛷𝑛. 𝛷* is maximal by construction. J
Proof of Lemma 4.4. In the first case of (RAA) we have 𝛷 ⊢ 𝜙 _ ∼𝜓,𝜙 _ 𝜓 by the
deduction theorem. L proves the Boolean tautologies (𝜙 _ ∼𝜓) _ (𝜓 _ ∼𝜙) and (𝜙 _
∼𝜙)_ ∼𝜙, hence 𝛷 ⊢ ∼𝜙 by (E_). The second case is proven with the theorem ∼∼𝜙_ 𝜙
of L. (MP() is just a shortcut for (Nec(), (Dis() and (E_). (MP) is proven as follows.
A ⊢ 𝜙_ 𝜓 MP
B {𝜗 𝜙}
1 ⊢ ∼𝜓 _ ∼𝜙 L (A)
2 ⊢ (𝜗( ∼𝜓) _ (𝜗( ∼𝜙) Nec(, Dis( (1)
3 ∼(𝜗( ∼𝜙) Def. (B)
4 ∼(𝜗( ∼𝜓) L (2 + 3)
5 𝜗 𝜓 Def. (4)
𝜗 𝜓
J
Proof of Proposition 5.1 (Soundness of HLSM). The system H applies only to ℳℒ
formulas and is hence sound by Corollary 2.2. The system L is easily confirmed sound, and
the soundness of S is proven as in Proposition 4.3. So we prove only the axioms M.
(Lin): Assume (𝒦, 𝑇 )  ∼𝜙. Then the unique successor team 𝑅[𝑇 ] does not satisfy 𝜙.
So it is not the case that (𝒦, 𝑅[𝑇 ])  𝜙, hence (𝒦, 𝑇 ) 2 𝜙 by definition of . The other
direction is similar. The flatness axiom (F♦) follows from the definition of a successor team.
(E), (I), (Dis), (Dis∆) are clear, and as well are (Nec) and (Nec∆): If a formula 𝜙 is a
theorem and hence holds in all teams, then it certainly holds for the image team of any team
and all successor teams in general.
It remains to prove (D♦).
“_”: Assume 𝒦 = (𝑊,𝑅, 𝑉 ) and (𝒦, 𝑇 )  ♦(𝜙 𝜓). Then 𝑇 has a successor team 𝑇 ′
which satisfies 𝜙  𝜓, i.e., there are 𝑆′ and 𝑈 ′ such that 𝑇 ′ = 𝑆′ ∪ 𝑈 ′, (𝒦, 𝑆′)  𝜙 and
(𝒦, 𝑈 ′)  𝜓. We have to find a split (𝑆,𝑈) of 𝑇 such that (𝒦, 𝑆)  ♦𝜙 and (𝒦, 𝑈)  ♦𝜓.
Define 𝑆 := { 𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 | 𝑣𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆′ } and 𝑈 := { 𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 | 𝑣𝑅𝑢, 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 ′ }. Now every world
𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 has at least one successor 𝑢 ∈ 𝑇 ′ as 𝑇 ′ is a successor team of 𝑇 . Since 𝑆′ ∪𝑈 ′ = 𝑇 ′, it
is either 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆′ or 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 ′. Hence by definition of 𝑆 and 𝑈 , 𝑣 is in 𝑆 or 𝑈 . So 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆 ∪ 𝑈 ,
and by definition of 𝑆 and 𝑈 then 𝑇 = 𝑆 ∪ 𝑈 . For proving (𝒦, 𝑆)  ♦𝜙 and (𝒦, 𝑈)  ♦𝜓 it
remains to show that 𝑆′ is really a successor team of 𝑆 (the proof for 𝑈 is similar). Certainly
every 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆 must have at least one successor in 𝑆′ by definition of 𝑆. Also every 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆′ has
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at least one predecessor in 𝑆: As 𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑇 ′ and 𝑇 ′ is a successor team of 𝑇 , it holds that 𝑢
has a predecessor in 𝑇 , say, 𝑣, but then 𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 , 𝑣𝑅𝑢 and 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆′, so 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆 by definition of 𝑆.
So 𝑆′ is a successor team of 𝑆.
“^”: Assume (𝒦, 𝑇 )  ♦𝜙 ♦𝜓 witnessed by 𝑇 = 𝑆 ∪ 𝑈 , (𝒦, 𝑆′)  𝜙 and (𝒦, 𝑈 ′)  𝜓,
𝑆′, 𝑈 ′ being successor teams of 𝑆 and 𝑈 . Then 𝑇 ′ = 𝑆′ ∪ 𝑈 ′ is a successor team of 𝑇 which
witnesses (𝒦, 𝑇 )  ♦(𝜙 𝜓). (𝒦, 𝑆′ ∪ 𝑈 ′)  𝜙 𝜓 is clear, so we prove that 𝑇 ′ is an actual
successor team of 𝑇 . If 𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 then 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆 or 𝑣 ∈ 𝑈 , so 𝑣 has a successor 𝑢 in 𝑆′ or 𝑈 ′, but
either way in 𝑇 ′. If 𝑢 ∈ 𝑇 ′ then 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆′ or 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 ′, so 𝑢 has a predecessor 𝑣 in 𝑆 or 𝑈 and
hence in 𝑇 . J
